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Introduction 
 
In The Awakening of the East, an English work written during his stay in India in 
1902 that begins with the line, “Brothers and Sisters of Asia, awake!” Okakura 
Kakuzo (Tenshin) emphasized that for the down-trodden Orient, “the glory of 
Europe is the humiliation of Asia.” On the other hand, the fact that an Asian 
country, Japan, concluded a treaty with Great Britain, the very symbol of “the 
glory of Europe,” was, together with the leading role that it played in putting down 
the Boxer uprising the previous year, a turning point clearly indicating that Japan 
had joined a world very different from that of “down-trodden” Asia. 
 Let us take a bird’s eye view of what was happening in the world then. In 
1902, at a time when colonial regimes were being established throughout the 
world, the United States declared the subjugation of the Philippines, while in 
Angola, Portugal, the first colonial empire, had its hands full putting down a major 
uprising. And with the new century, the Netherlands, along with Great Britain a 
leading colonial power, proclaimed an “enlightened” colonial policy in its East 
Indies colony (present day Indonesia). The “ethical course,” as it was called, was 
described in glowing terms by its leading proponent Van Deventer: “How beautiful 
is the goal which we have set ourselves to achieve! Thanks to the efforts of the 
Netherlands, a society is to be built in this far distant land in the East that will 
give him prosperity and a high culture and that he will acknowledge with 
gratitude. . .”1 It was not only the Dutch who cherished the myth of white 
superiority and the idea that it was the white man’s duty to form an association 
based on that superiority with the subject peoples of color: these were the beliefs 
that underpinned the “glory of Europe” in the age of colonial imperialism.  
 A century later, the political map of the world has completely changed. 
Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to gain independence after World 
War II, and for many years a third world leader, now faces the serious challenge of 
maintaining unity of the state. And on May 20, 2002 “the last colony,” East Timor, 
came to birth as the first nation state of this century. East Timor’s independence 
came not from the Europe that “trampled on” Asia, but as the result of a national 
liberation struggle that pitted it against Indonesia, one of the former “humiliated” 
of the earth. Indonesia had in effect placed East Timor, with which it shares a 
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border, under colonial rule through an armed invasion at the end of 1975. And 
then it sought to justify its annexation of the territory in terms of a theory of 
civilization, an Indonesian-style ethical policy, by saying that “it is a historical 
happy ending for East Timorese, as they overcome the backwardness of their 
civilization and are liberated from the fate of more than four centuries of colonial 
rule.” 2  
 The leaders of the new Democratic Republic of East Timor have chosen 
Portuguese as the official language, although only five percent of the 850,000 
population understand it. As is seen too in its eagerness to join the Community of 
Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), East Timor is seeking cultural 
decolonization through a loose cultural association with its former European 
colonial master. What would Tenshin, who proclaimed Asia “one” in its 
“humiliation” vis-à-vis the “glory of Europe,” have felt had he seen Indonesia and 
East Timor over the past quarter century and seen the new ties being forged today 
between East Timor and its former master, Portugal? 
 These preliminary remarks have been a bit long, but this study will 
examine in outline two points, focusing on Indonesia, a country that went from 
once being one of the “downtrodden” of Asia to become a country that “trampled” 
on its own neighbor. The first point is the issue of how Indonesia, the pioneer of 
decolonization in postwar Asia, views Japanese rule over the archipelago under 
“the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.” And in connection with this point, 
comparing the historical understanding of the Netherlands and Japan on this 
same period, I would like to establish the fact that this is still a sensitive issue 
today. The second point will explore the context in which Indonesia, the subject of 
a “glorious” resistance against Japan (and, of course, the Netherlands), turned into 
a harsh ruler of East Timor, while making comparisons with Japan’s rule over 
Indonesia, 
 
 
 
Assessing the Japanese Occupation Period in Indonesia 
 
In looking these days at Indonesia’s historical understanding of Japan and the 
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Netherlands, many interesting things can be seen. One is the very strong reaction 
to the film, Merdeka 17805 (merdeka is an Indonesian word, meaning freedom or 
independence), that was released in Japan in 2001. The program notes say that 
the film is based on the historical fact that after the Japanese defeat “some 2000 
Japanese soldiers stayed behind in Indonesia and took part in the independence 
war against the Dutch.” It also informs us of the fact that the proclamation of 
independence by Sukarno and Hatta, the country’s first president and 
vice-president, respectively, was dated “17805,” that is, the 17th of August of the 
year 2605 of the Imperial Era, shows “the gratitude” which the two leaders felt for 
Japan, and that this fact “is remembered by Indonesian people to this day.” 
 Needless to say, the intention of the producer – the same Fuji Yukio who 
portrayed Tojo Hideki so flatteringly in Pride  – was to present the Japanese 
occupation as having played an important role in Indonesia’s (and more widely, 
Southeast Asia’s) national independence, and by emphasizing this, to restore 
“Japanese pride.” But contrary to the film maker’s intent, which was rooted in the 
same thinking as that of the so-called “Atarashii rekishi kyoukasho wo tsukuru 
kai [Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform],” this film based on a 
Japan-centered view of history ended up offending Indonesian pride. The 
authoritative Indonesian weekly Tempo (June 10, 2001) reported that Merdeka 
angered Indonesians living in Japan because it overplays Japan as a hero.” 
 Another example is in connection with the 400th anniversary of the 
establishment of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). For the Netherlands, one 
of the more successful members of today’s EU, the birth of the VOC in 1602 was at 
the heart of that country’s “glory,” and all kinds of grand commemorative events 
were planned. An historical drama lauding the VOC was written for the occasion 
and broadcast on the state-run television station. In it there is an idyllic scene 
showing local people in an Asian country (evidently Indonesia) carrying trade 
goods and gifts to a Dutch VOC official, suggestive of a harmonious relationship 
between the VOC and Asia. Indonesians studying in Holland were asked to play 
the part of the “indigenous workers” carrying the goods. However some of the 
students protested that this not only deeply offended the dignity of Indonesia, but 
that it represented a Dutch-centric historical view that ignored the relationship 
between the VOC and the colonial rule that followed. And the Indonesian 
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Embassy in the Netherlands carried a piece entitled “The Indonesian perspective 
on the 400th anniversary of the VOC” on its official website on the concept behind 
the commemoration in general, including the drama, stating that the VOC was, 
from its conception, dependant on the use of force and that Indonesia was not 
about to celebrate its founding.3 
 How then does Indonesia, which to this day shows such a sensitive reaction 
to its “history of subjugation,” place the Japanese occupation within its national 
history? (See Table 1.) Since the conclusion of a peace treaty between Indonesia and 
Japan in 1958, the relationship between the two on the political and economic 
levels has been “solid.” However the solidity of this political and economic 
relationship (in other words, of the superstructure) has not necessarily been based 
on mutual understanding among ordinary people or on a solid substructure of 
intellectual exchanges in the cultural sphere. Particularly since the beginning of the 
1970s, when the economic presence of Japan in Indonesia had expanded to the 
point where it was “structural,” a pattern repeatedly occurred in which complex 
feelings toward Japan that had lain dormant in the deep layers of the people’s 
consciousness — feelings that derive from experiences and memories of the war 
years — came out in explosive form when triggered by some incident or other. 
Paradoxically, in the Sukarno era (up until 1965), when Japanese economic 
penetration was not so noticeable, almost no large anti-Japanese movements 
occurred, in site of the fact that memories of the occupation were still fresh. 
 In looking at the overall trends in how the Japanese occupation period is 
described in post-independence history textbooks and supplementary readers in 
Indonesia, the following characteristics can be seen. 
(1) The major concern of Indonesian historical scholars up until the first half of the 
1960s was, as is clear from the underlying tone of the country’s first national 
history seminar in 1958, how to construct an “Indonesia-centric” history. With 
respect to the Japanese occupation, this concern is reflected in the fact that Japan 
was a priori designated a “fascist” and “militarist” state, and the nationalistic view 
of Indonesia as having resisted harsh Japanese rule and struggled for 
independence appeared in sharp relief. Not officially acknowledging that some 
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Japanese (particularly some connected to the Naval Liaison Office) were involved 
in the process of drawing up the Independence Declaration of August 17, 1945 was 
an expression of these nationalistic sentiments. 
 
(2) A change in the evaluation of the Japanese occupation within modern history 
description in Indonesia came about after an Army-centered regime came to power 
in the wake of the “30th of September incident” of 1965. The leadership group, 
including General Suharto, who became Indonesia’s second president, was largely 
composed of people who had come out of the Japanese military-organized PETA 
(Army for the Defense of the Fatherland) and the Sumatra voluntary army. They 
called themselves the “New Order” and undertook in earnest a compilation of 
national history from a military-centered historical perspective. This task later 
went ahead under the guidance of Director of the Center for the Armed Forces 
History, Nugroho Notosusanto, who also served as minister of education and 
culture and rector of the University of Indonesia. In particular, Vol. 6 of the 
enormous six-tome Sejarah Nasional Indonesia  (National History of Indonesia) 
that resulted was for all practical purposes directly supervised by Notosusanto 
himself. This work became the model for a history education that would fix the 
unity of the centralized state through the concept of the “dual (military/civil) 
function” of the military and Pancasila democracy” as official New Order ideology, 
and it played an important role in history education in the Suharto era.4 
 With this, an interpretation of the occupation period emerged that was 
distinct from the previous focus on Indonesia-as-victim. There was no 
fundamental difference on the point of describing the Japanese occupation as 
“three and a half years of darkness,” but by portraying the Indonesian people as 
having acquired “national toughness” in their conquering of the “darkness,” the 
Indonesian peoples’ autonomy and the dualistic nature of the impact of Japanese 
military rule are emphasized. And PETA becomes the most significant force 
representing the people in their resistance against the harsh political repression, 
social and economic exploitation, and cultural coercion under the Japanese, with 
the PETA rebellion in Blitar, East Java in the last phase of the occupation in Feb. 
1945 as the high point of that resistance. Out of this interpretation is drawn the 
official “New Order” ideology that has the Armed Forces, one important 
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constituent element of which was PETA (they don’t take the view that PETA was 
the parent organization of the Armed Forces) tasked with leading the Indonesian 
state and society, as the guardian of the “unity and independence of the nation.” 
 
(3) While Indonesia experienced a deepening of political and economic turmoil 
after the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998, it enjoyed a flowering of 
freedom of expression. The Armed Forces-centered view of modern Indonesian 
history needed to be greatly revised, and a committee under the direct control of 
the government is now at work drawing up new guidelines for history education.5 
But with respect to the Japanese occupation period, even if there is a correction of 
the overemphasis on PETA and the Blitar revolt, there is not likely to be any great 
change in the position of drawing out both positive and negative aspects of the 
Japanese occupation. One reason is that there is a deeply entrenched view in the 
Indonesian government – and that goes for not only the Suharto regime, but for 
the three regimes that followed, the Habibi, Wahid, and Megawati regimes – that 
it would go against the national interest to damage its relationship with its biggest 
economic aid donor, Japan, over an “historical issue of the past.” But more than 
that, there is now a well-established consensus that they themselves who endured 
the harsh Japanese occupation, drew out of it concrete benefits such as the 
diffusion of the Indonesia language, military training, and the unification of 
education. The late Nishimura Shigeo, an authority on Indonesian education, 
points out that, “This issue is often referred to as the good and bad of the Japanese 
occupation, but if the bad can be said to be emphasized by being put in bold face, 
then the good could be said to written in very fine script. Basically, they take the 
view that Japan did what it did in its own national interest, that of the “Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” and not particularly for the independence of 
Indonesia. Indonesia merely learned various things by taking advantage of it.”6 
 
 
The Japanese Occupation as Public Memory in Indonesia 
 
In terms of public education, then, compared with neighboring Singapore or the 
Philippines, Indonesia in recent years uses restrained tones in its evaluation of the 
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Japanese occupation period. On the other hand, the picture of that period one gets 
from the historical monuments and the exhibits in historical museums in Jakarta 
and elsewhere emphasizes in more stark, visual terms the dark side of the war 
period. In the Museum of National History under the national monument in the 
heart of Jakarta, built with some of the war reparation funds from Japan, there is 
a diorama portraying “Indonesia” from prehistoric times to the present, and the 
single object representing the Japanese occupation is the figure of a 
“romusha”(laborer) working under a formidable-looking Japanese soldier, face 
distorted in pain. As shown in the entry for “romusha” in the Ensiklopedia 
Indonesia –– The word “romusha” in Indonesia indicates persons requisitioned in 
the period of Japanese military government for the strengthening of defenses 
either at home or abroad. Many died, unable to endure the suffering and hunger.” 
– “romusha” is recognized, transcending generations, as a Japanese word that has 
entered the Indonesian language and as a symbol of the three and a half years of 
occupation “darkness.”  
 The social and political nuances of “romusha” came out most strikingly in 
the debate that surrounded the Indonesian movie Romusha in the second half of 
1973. This was a time when Suharto’s “New Order” was being consolidated, but 
criticism of its harsh nature was still tolerated within certain bounds; and 
Romusha, the work of Sjumandjaya, a social issue-oriented director who had 
studied in the Soviet Union, was made against the background of the ever-growing 
influence of Japan’s economic inroads in the country. But in the end, unable to get 
a permit from the Department of Information (abolished after the collapse of the 
Suharto regime), the film was never released. Government officials had decided 
that this film depicting the Japanese occupation might stimulate latent 
anti-Japanese sentiments and possibly damage the relationship with Japan, 
which by that time had replaced the United States as the largest investor and 
donor of economic aid. It was reported that behind this “self-restraint” on the part 
of the authorities there had been requests from the Japanese Embassy and the 
Japan Club, the leading members of which are large trading companies and 
corporations; and an important task for research in the history of postwar 
relations between the two countries would be to positively substantiate the facts in 
the suppression of this film through primary materials from both sides and 
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interviews with the persons involved.  
 In any case, with the banning of Romusha, debate in Indonesia heated up 
over the Japanese occupation, with a very critical tone in the mass media 
predominating. “Why,” it was asked, “does ‘big brother’ (during the war Japan 
referred to itself as ‘big brother,’ Indonesia as ‘little brother’) still to this day have to 
butt into our affairs . . . so that to this day Romusha, an Indonesian film made for 
Indonesians, cannot be shown because of protests from the Japanese?” “Our weak 
point up to now has been our not writing our own national history ourselves. Our 
national history has always been written by foreigners. If the Japanese don’t like 
us remembering the romusha, they shouldn’t have conscripted romusha in the 
first place.”7 
 Rooted in public memories of the Japanese occupation, the controversy over 
the film Romusha was in fact a manifestation of an economic nationalism that 
perceived the ever deepening economic penetration of Japan as a new “invasion.” 
Only a few months later, on the occasion of the (January 1974) visit of Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Jakarta, anti-Japanese riots, referred to as the “Malari 
Affair,” broke out, creating what was to be the greatest political crisis of the 
Suharto era and what we know now to have been a power struggle over relations 
with Japan.8 
 At the beginning of the 1990s, a half century after the war, there was 
growing debate over Japan’s “war responsibility,” and a new and important 
element of the debate was added in the form of the ianfu (comfort women) issue. 
After the Japanese government, in July 1992, admitted publicly the existence of 
the comfort women this issue became a major bone of contention between Japan 
and South Korea, from where the greatest number of women were taken, and 
other East Asian countries as well.  
 However in Indonesia, there was a quite different reaction. Aamong those 
old enough to have known the Japanese occupation, there was a certain common 
knowledge, propagated through various media, of the existence of Japanese 
comfort stations, known by the names “rumah kuning (yellow house)” and “rumah 
bambu (bamboo house),” and the women who worked there but otherwise these 
were not the objects of social interest, to say nothing of academic interest. In 1982 
a novel, Kadarwati: Wanita dengan Lima Nama (Kadarwati: the woman with five 
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names) by the popular writer, Pandir Kelana, came out that depicted the 
checkered fate of a girl who was taken to Singapore as a “comfort woman,” but it 
did not draw any particular attention from the public at the time. In the summer 
of 1992, however, after the Japanese government announced that there were also 
Indonesian comfort women, this novel was reissued in a new paperback edition 
and became a best seller. But given its close political and economic ties with Japan, 
the Indonesia government did not depart from its position of treating the issue of 
comfort women as an extremely minor matter.  
The authorities in the former Japanese colonies of South Korea and Taiwan, 
for example, concerned about the rising anger over the issue among their own 
people, demanded an apology of Japan for denying that these women, whose 
existence by this time had been officially admitted, had been forced to perform this 
work (to be later admitted in 1993). In contrast, the Indonesian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs lauded the Japanese government for having made what it 
considered virtually an official apology because Tokyo had released historical 
documents on the issue. The ministry further stated: 
“Indonesia wants to look to the future and not be tied to the past. This is 
not to say however that the moral violation of their honor suffered by the 
Indonesian women who were forced to be ‘comfort women’ for the 
Japanese army during the last war can be forgotten. No matter what the 
Japanese government may do, their honor will not be restored. But it is 
not the intention of the Indonesian government to exaggerate this issue. 
This government would like to see the Japanese government accurately 
study the ‘comfort women’ issue and take measures for the honor of the 
women in keeping with the seriousness of the Japanese army’s violation 
of their human rights.”9 
 
 On the other hand, in April 1993 the Indonesian government, probably with 
its frequent critic, the watch-dog, legal aid organization, LBH, chiefly in mind, 
expressed its displeasure at the fact that five members of the Human Rights 
Committee of the Japan Federation of  Bar Associations had, without getting 
permission, interviewed a woman believed to have been a comfort woman with the 
cooperation of LBH and other human rights NGOs. 
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 The mass media too generally tended to avoid blowing up the issue. Take, 
for instance, the daily, Suara Pembaruan, which at the time of the Emporer’s visit 
in the autumn of the previous year had written in its editorial of October 3 entitled 
“The wounds are healed, but the scars remain” that “Officially, the sufferings of 
the Indonesian people under Japanese occupation and militarism have been 
healed through war reparations. But the suffering and the wounds from cruelty 
still remain, which is only natural as they are burned into their minds.” This paper 
(April 21), under the headline “ Don’t wound the women who were victims of the 
Japanese army any more!” prominently featured the wishy-washy remarks on the 
issue of the comfort women by the head of the woman’s division of the veterans 
association. And the country’s most influential daily, Kompas (July 8), while 
pointing out the fundamental seriousness of the issue, added the comment: “Let us 
put an end to the past, as past, and deal with present issues in the context of the 
present. For in the end, it is the future which we are facing and not the past. It is 
not our intention to exaggerate the comfort women issue.” 
 While the comfort women issue is for many countries of Asia a very 
controversial point in its diplomatic relations with Japan, the Indonesian reactions, 
official and unofficial, described above give the impression of being, if anything, too 
conciliatory. The main reason for this is that although, as mentioned above, the 
comfort women issue is a part of the pain of the Japanese occupation period, 
unlike the romusha, it is not regarded as having penetrated very deeply into the 
public memory. In other words, it is regarded as a “special issue” in a sense, rather 
than as a “universal issue.” And in this, there is doubtless at work the cold 
calculation that does not want to see the very pragmatic relationship with the 
country’s greatest economic aid donor damaged over a “special” issue of the past. 
At the time, the Indonesian relations with its western allies had turned chilly over 
the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, the “provincial capital” of East 
Timor. So Japan, which had consistently supported Jakarta’s position on the East 
Timor issue, even in the wake of Santa Cruz, would have been regarded by 
Jakarta as a very important pipe that it would not have wanted to weaken. 
 Reluctance to make waves over the comfort women issue is clear too from 
remarks by I. Kutut Surajaya, who, as chair of the Indonesian Association of 
Japanese Studies, was a leading channel for cultural exchange with Japan. 
 11
Evidently with the 1974 Malari Affair in mind, Surajaya emphasized that the 
comfort women issue must not be allowed to be used politically by groups critical of 
the government and turned into an anti-Japan movement. “Even if,” he said, 
“there are materials on the women mobilized by the Japanese military, these 
should be regarded only as historical materials. They must never be used as 
bargaining materials. Historical materials on the past should be interpreted in the 
context of that time. Even though they might be related, it would be very 
troublesome and give rise to much criticism if issues of the past were to be mixed 
up with political interests today.”10 
 In short, because it had an aspect connected to the social and cultural 
structure of Indonesia itself, an issue “appearing out of the blue” like that of the 
comfort women presented problems for the Indonesian government and 
intellectuals with close ties to Japan. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, by 
becoming a big issue among the public, the problem of the comfort women planted 
a new aspect into the image of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia. 
 The Indonesian government (Ministry of Social Affairs) from the very 
beginning of the emergence of the comfort women issue had made clear that it had 
no intention of asking Japan for individual compensation for the comfort women. 
This also applied to the payment of compensation money to the victims by the 
Asian Women’s Fund (official name: Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation) that 
was set up in 1995 as a show piece of the Murayama Cabinet. Indonesian policy 
was that the government “would not allow ‘comfort women’ as individuals to 
receive money from the fund. The money will be used for providing social welfare 
facilities such as homes for the elderly.” As this did not quite gibe with the idea 
upon which the Fund was established, it presented some confusion, but in the end 
it was agreed between the two governments that ¥380 million would be paid to 
the ministry over a period of ten years for the construction of fifty social welfare 
facilities for the aged throughout Indonesia to be completed by the year 2007. 
Needless to say, these facilities are completely unrelated to the material and 
psychological compensation that the elderly women who had had their human 
dignity trampled on were asking the former aggressor country for. Legally 
speaking, the comfort women issue was stamped “closed” with the finalizing of the 
impersonal compensation agreement between the two countries’ governments. 
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Comparison of the Historical Perspectives on Indonesia of Japan and the 
Netherlands  
 
The author has described in several studies the way in which Japan has come 
today to conceptualize its rule of Indonesia (Southeast Asia) in the days when it 
claimed to be setting up the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” for “Asian 
liberation.”11 Linked to the inward-looking nationalism that spread following the 
1990s collapse of the Cold War structure, an historical view has arisen in Japan in 
recent years that is impossible to reconcile with that of the Japanese occupation 
held by the countries of Southeast Asia, a view in which the aggressive nature of 
its rule has faded and the perception of this rule as a liberation — the 
independence contribution theory — has been enhanced. Political developments at 
the time precipitated a heightened sense of crisis among conservatives in Japan. 
These included the admission of the “compulsory” nature of the comfort women 
system by the Miyazawa Kiichi cabinet (the cabinet that was to be the “last” in the 
Liberal Democratic Party’s one-party rule), the “war of aggression” statement by 
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, (who headed the coalition cabinet that 
followed the demise of the “’1955 System,” as that decades-long one-party rule was 
called), and the “no war” resolution adopted by the National Diet at the time when 
Socialist Party chair, Murayama Tomiichi headed the cabinet. Against this 
background, a “Kokumin undo [National movement]” based on the reactionary 
nationalism of the above-mentioned the Japanese Society for History Textbook 
Reform was organized, one result of which was publication by Fusosha in 2001 of a 
revisionist junior high school history textbook. Although the rate of adoption of this 
textbook for the 2002 school year was only 0.03 percent, it serves as a reminder of 
how deeply rooted in the historical consciousness of the Japanese is the theory of 
the occupation contributing to the independence in Southeast Asia. I would also 
like to point out that, pushed by the momentum of this gung-ho “national 
movement,” in the summer of 2002 a “Great East Asia Holy War Monument” was 
erected on the grounds of the Gokoku Shrine (a shrine for the war dead) in the city 
of Kanazawa, on which are inscribed the names of  many wartime 
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Indonesia-related individuals and organizations. 
 Another thing to be considered when thinking of perceptions of the 
Japanese occupation period in Indonesia is the existence of the former colonial 
ruler, the Netherlands. As the egg-throwing incident that occurred at the time of 
the Showa emperor’s visit to Holland in 1971 symbolizes, at the heart of the public 
memory in Holland are feelings of humiliation at having had its “beautiful colony” 
seized by the Asian country, Japan, and deep resentment at the horrific conditions 
in concentration camps that 135,000 Dutch people were forced to endure and that 
claimed the lives of some 20 percent of them. Just how strong these feelings – 
known as “camp syndrome” – were is reflected in the “Protocol on the Resolution of 
Private Claims with the Netherlands” that Japan signed in 1956, under which it 
agreed to pay $10 million to 92,000 Dutch civilians, former internees, as 
“compensation.” This payment of compensation was a form of exceptional, private, 
compensation outside the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and it 
was made against the background of the issue of the release of Japanese war 
criminals connected with the Dutch East Indies who were being held in Sugamo 
Prison and whose release was not allowed right up to the end.12 This was a 
“trade-off,” so to speak, by Japan and the Netherlands, made in view of the two 
countries’ respective national interests. With this, peace between the two countries 
was at last formally concluded. 
 Yet today, nearly a half-century since this “political settlement,” the fact 
remains that — as shown in Table 1, and in spite of the various cultural exchange 
programs recently in connection with the “400th Anniversary of Japan-Holland 
Fiendship”— in a section of Dutch society, anti-Japanese sentiments based on war 
experiences still run strong.  
 For instance, in 1999 the Dutch government designated August 15 a day of 
the same official weight as May 4-5, the anniversary of liberation from Nazism. 
This is, of course, because August 15 is remembered throughout the Netherlands 
as the day Japanese rule in its “beautiful colony” ended and as the day that many 
Dutch people, including women and children, got their freedom back. How does 
the Netherlands, on the other hand, regard the fact of its colonial rule over 
Indonesia? The prominent author, Rudy Kausbrugh, spent his youth in a 
Japanese concentration camp in Sumatra, but in his book, Het Oostindisch 
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Kampsyndroom (the Japanese title, Loss of Colonies of Western Countries and 
Japan, published by Soshisha), he referred straightforwardly to Holland’s own 
wrongdoings in Indonesia and argued that to be hung up forever on the experience 
in Japanese camps was a kind of racism. There was such a backlash in the country, 
however, that he was forced to leave the Netherlands for a while. 
 The twenty-first century approaching, Prime Minister Wim Kok stated in 
the spring of 2000 that the Netherlands “should apologize to Indonesia for its past 
colonial rule.” But this statement too evoked a harsh response from the public, and 
the prime minister was forced to retract it. And seeing the self-assurance of the 
last English and Portuguese governor-generals at the times of the hand-over of 
Hong Kong and Macau to China, and the “comeback,” to be described below, that 
Portugal is having in East Timor, one wonders what meaning things like taking 
“historical responsibility” for, or “apologizing” for the former colonies have for 
European countries, or if their attitudes might not best be called subconscious 
orientalism. In connection with this point, I might add that in Dutch history 
textbooks one is hard put to find any description that reflects an understanding of 
Holland’s colonial rule in Indonesia as assailants. One high school textbook as 
much as suggests that the Indonesian independence movement was “made in 
Japan: describing that “The Japanese, with their staunch militarism and 
prejudice toward the West, pursued a plan of organizing Indonesian youth . . . and 
after liberation, the pemuda (youths) who had been trained under the Japanese 
continued fighting the western rulers who came back again.”13 
 While it is obvious that even today, in the formation of the Japanese and 
Dutch public memories of Japanese wartime rule in Indonesia, “memories never 
go out from the borders of the country,”14 it should be noted that since the 1990s 
exchanges in research on the Japanese occupation among the three countries 
concerned, Indonesia included, have developed remarkably. In this process, the 
vigorous pursuit of research exchanges by the national (formerly royal) 
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) and the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) is very significant. In particular, NIOD’s proposals for a 
series of studies contemplate research on the Japanese occupation of Indonesia 
that would break out of the confines of each country’s public memory, the head of 
research, Peter Romijn, making the point that “Dutch and overseas historians 
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have squarely faced the challenge of overcoming the national perspective that has 
always dominated historical research.” And reflecting further on the fact that 
“Dutch history scholars were concerned (only) with the questions of how Japan 
was able to so easily defeat the Dutch East Indies, and why it was impossible for 
their country’s colonial system to continue after the war,” Romijn calls for shedding 
that parochial perspective and deepening a multifaceted and international 
comparative perspective that would not confine its focus on change in Indonesia to 
the war period, but, in the longer time frame of the 1920s to the 1960s, consider it 
not only from the perspective of political history, but also from that of economy, 
ethnicity and minorities, religion, culture, concepts of Asia on the part of the 
Japanese and of Japan on the part of Asia.15 
 
 
Indonesia’s Rule over East Timor 
 
Indonesia, a country that had endured the “darkness” of the Japanese occupation 
and become a pioneer among the colonized of the world in declaring its 
independence, thirty years later, at the end of 1975, became the first country in 
Southeast Asia to redraw its border through resort to force of arms. And then the 
following year, 1976, on its own Independence Day, August 17, held a grandiose 
celebration in Dili, the capitol of East Timor, which it had just annexed as its 27th 
province. In his Independence Day speech in Jakarta, President Suharto boasted 
that “We are now at last welcoming back as brothers to the big family of the 
Indonesian nation the people of East Timor.” 
 In 1913 the Indonesian independence movement pioneer Suwardi 
Surjaningrat (later called Dewantoro) replied to the Dutch colonial government’s 
invitation to join it’s centennial anniversary celebration of Holland’s liberation 
(from Napoleanic rule) by saying: “If I were a Dutch person, I would not celebrate 
my country’s independence in a country still a colony. First I would give the people 
we are ruling their independence, and only then would I celebrate our 
independence.”16 Although the bitter irony of this statement would have been lost 
on President Suharto, by replacing “a Dutch person” with “an Indonesian,” the 
independence movement leader’s words perfectly express the feelings of most East 
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Timorese in 1976, feelings that were at the root of the Timorese nationalism that 
was to grow in the years ahead.  
 The Indonesia that had overthrown Dutch and Japanese rule and had been 
the Third World standard bearer of anti-colonialism turned into a violent 
oppressor of national self-determination, but how is this fact being interpreted in 
Indonesia’s historical consciousness? In connection with this point, I would like to 
compare the Japanese military occupation with the Indonesian occupation of East 
Timor (See Table 2). Of course there are differences in the two cases. The Japanese 
occupation was during World War II, while the Indonesian takeover took place 
against the background of the Cold War. Also, the depth of historical and cultural 
links between ruler and ruled differed, as did the length of the period of rule. But 
the following commonalities can be seen in the Japanese military occupation of 
Indonesia and Indonesia’s rule of East Timor. 
 
(1) Both carried out their rule by enforcing strongman values against a 
background of overwhelming military might. And both share the striking contrast 
between the “beauty” of their ideologies of rule – (Japan’s “Asian liberation” and 
“Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” and Indonesia’s “civilizing mission” and 
“union of brothers”) – and the actual brutality of that rule. Also, both countries 
failed to grasp (at least during the period of rule) the huge contradiction between 
their ideologies and reality. 
 
(2) There is a seven-fold difference in the period of rule — three and a half years in 
the case of the one, a quarter-century in the case of the other –– but both of the 
peoples ruled strengthened their nationalism through a resistance to their foreign 
rulers that was both tough and flexible. Particularly East Timor, which had seen 
almost no rise of nationalist consciousness under Portuguese colonial rule, saw the 
growth of a national identity as “the people of East Timor,” as symbolized in the 
name of the pivotal organization of the independence struggle, Council of East 
Timor National Resistance (CNRT), a national identity that overcame the 
differences between the regional ethnic groups. And in both cases, the lingua 
franca in the respective regions – Indonesian and Tetum – was an important 
medium for the expansion of nationalism among the people. At the same time, this 
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played a certain role in the “modernization” of these languages. In Indonesia, the 
result was that Indonesian was designated the single national language (Bahasa 
Nasional) in the independent nation, but in the Democratic Republic of East Timor, 
Portuguese, which had become the political tool of the political elite, was chosen as 
the first official language for the time being. Interestingly, the former colonial 
power, Portugal, is putting a lot of effort into Portuguese language education in 
East Timor, including sending over many young language teachers. With the 
cooperation of the Australian linguistics scholar Geoffrey Hull, work is now 
underway on the systematization of Tetum, but Timorese language scholars 
themselves say that it will take two generations for Tetum to become a modern 
language, and that in preparation, a Tetum course will be set up at the University 
of East Timor from 2005 to train Tetum teachers.17   
 
(3) Another point in common is that the involvement of the United Nations and 
the international community as a whole was important in the processes whereby 
both Indonesia and East Timor achieved final independence. Indonesia fought an 
independence war against the Dutch for four years, up until the end of 1949?but 
during that period UN mediation (UN Commission on Indonesia), and other 
initiatives such as those by India’s Prime Minister Nehru, the Inter-Asian 
Relations Conference  (March 1947) and the Conference of Independent Nations 
in Asia (January 1947), both in New Delhi, had an important influence on the 
building of an international consensus supporting Indonesian independence. But 
that same Indonesia was later, particularly after the Nov. 1991 Santa Cruz 
massacre, to be inundated with criticism by the international community for its 
actions in East Timor. The awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to two men 
who called for self-determination and were symbols of the East Timorese 
resistance to Indonesian rule, Bishop Carlos Filipe Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta 
(East Timor’s first foreign minister), was a manifestation of international criticism 
of Indonesia.18 
 
 
Conclusion 
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After these considerations, I would like now to touch on the issue of how Indonesia 
and East Timor each perceive the quarter century of their “unfortunate past.”  
 As I have said, in Indonesia there is a deeply rooted consciousness of the 
integration of East Timor as the “civilizing” of a backward neighbor under the 
name of “Indonesianization.” That is why, even after President Habibi’s acceptance 
of the independence option in the beginning of 1999, and even today with the 
advances made in democratization, one almost never hears an interpretation 
reflecting a spirit of atonement. In fact, President Megawati, who was invited to 
the East Timor Independence celebration in May 2002, used the occasion (and 
probably did so because of the very strong opposition from the military to her 
attending the ceremony at all) to visit the Seroja Heroes Cemetery in Dili where 
some 3,600 of the many Indonesian soldiers who died in the war are buried (Seroja 
means water lily, but the Indonesian army called the December 1975 military 
operation of invading East Timor “Operasi Seroja.”) Then in early July the 
foundation stone laying ceremony for a “Seroja Monument” to the soldiers who 
died in the East Timor war was held in a corner of the military’s sprawling 
headquarters in Cilangkap, a verdant suburban area south of Jakarta, and this 
too was attended by the president. The unveiling of the monument is scheduled for 
November 10 this year (November 10 is commemorated in Indonesia as a 
“historical” day, in 1945, when the Surabaya struggle that heralded the 
independence struggle took place). 
 Furthermore, in the work of reviewing history textbooks referred to above, 
Indonesia’s rule of East Timor is one of the points being reviewed. A 
supplementary history book for high school students published in 2002, for 
instance, objectively describes how, although East Timor progressed socially and 
economically under Indonesian rule, excessive human rights violations, as 
exemplified in the Santa Cruz massacre, brought down the heavy censure of the 
international community, or the fact that the growth of a nationalism demanding 
national self-determination was reflected in the results of the August 1999 popular 
referendum. These things are presented quite matter-of-factly, something that 
would have been unthinkable under Suharto. A lot of space in the same book is 
also devoted to Indonesia’s democratization movement that brought about the 
downfall of the Suharto regime. That the waves of reform have reached the pages 
 19
of history textbooks is clear too, for instance, in the section on the killing by army 
troops of Trisakti University students, the incident that became the spark that set 
off the drama of the regime change, where the names of the four murdered 
students are recorded, and they are mourned as victims in the democratization 
movement.19 
 How does East Timor, on the other hand, which is believed to have lost 
one-fifth of its population under Indonesia, view rule by its giant neighbor? 
Xanana Gusmáo, hero of the resistance and East Timor’s first president, a man 
who spent eight years in Indonesian prisons or under house arrest –– (whatever 
may be the complicated feelings in the depths of his heart) –– has consistently 
called for reconciliation and harmony with Indonesia. This attitude was very 
clearly exhibited during the Independence ceremony in the way that Xanana took 
much greater pains to honor President Megawati than he did for other 
distinguished guests such as former President Clinton, Australian Prime Minister 
Howard, or Portuguese President Sampaio. In fact, this is what Xanana said at a 
press conference on May 17, just before the ceremony: “I won’t allow even a single 
fly to bother President Megawati when she visits the Seroja Heroes Cemetery. 
Now that the goal of our struggle has been accomplished, I am determined to build 
good relations with our neighbors, particularly Indonesia and Australia. We people 
of East Timor last year welcomed to East Timor former President Wahid. Mutual 
distrust with Indonesia is not necessary, it is the cultivation of mutual trust that is 
important. We have reached an agreement to hold frequent talks with officers of 
the Indonesian armed forces and to build friendly relations.”20 
 This flexible stance of the top leader toward the “former enemy,” a stance 
which outsiders might consider “weakness,” no doubt comes from an awareness 
that for the mini new state of East Timor (area, 14,000 sq km, population, some 
850,000), surrounded as it is by giant Indonesia (area. 1,920,000 sq km, population, 
some 200,000,000), this is the only option for guaranteeing the security of the state, 
even the very existence of its people, By the same token, the pronouncements by 
East Timor’s top leaders have also been very flexible with respect to Japan, which 
occupied Timor during WWII and was the sole country among the advanced 
nations which supported Indonesian policy on East Timor right up to the end. 
Should government leaders’ conciliatory statements be seen as the only option for 
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an East Timor faced with building a country “from scratch” – statements such as 
“We do not intend to ask for war compensation,” or “The past is past; we are 
seeking friendly relations with Japan for the present and the future”? In contrast 
with this is the statement protesting the dispatch of Self Defense Forces to East 
Timor and demanding of Japan a clear apology for its wartime rule, a statement 
issued by the “Working group on justice for victims of Japanese military 
occupation” composed of twenty East Timor NGOs.  
 How are we to unravel the interwoven strands of the twentieth century – 
strands that bound together Japan, Indonesia, East Timor, . . . and those countries 
with the Netherlands and Portugal, . . . and the international environment that 
enveloped them all – and as we discover relationships and make comparisons, 
weave history together as we begin to journey into the twenty-first century? 
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Table 1 Three-Country Comparison on Japanese Occupation 
 
 Indonesia Japan Netherlands Remarks 
Research 
(Main viewpoint) 
Conquering darkness, duality 
of military rule impact  
Agent of change (Indonesian 
autonomy), recolonization, not 
liberation 
Result of Japanese expansionism, 
part of longtime change 
3-country research 
exchange from 
1990s, loose 
agreement 
Main int’l 
symposium 
output 
Taufik Abdullah, ed. The 
Heartbeat of Indonesian 
Revolution (Gramedia,1997) 
Kura?awa Aiko, ed. Tounan 
Ajiashi no naka no Nihon 
senryou [Japanese occupation in 
Southeast Asian history] (Waseda 
Univ. Press, 1997) 
Peter Post and Elly 
Touwen-Bouwsma, eds., Japan, 
Indonesia and War (KITLV Press, 
1997) 
 
Oral history Start of Oral History section of 
National Archive (1973) 
Nihon senryouki 
Indoneshiashiryo foramu, ed., 
Shougenshuu Nihongun 
senryouka no indoneshia  
[Testimonies on Indonesia under 
Japanese military occupation] 
(Ryukei Shyosha, 1991) 
 
Indonesia Oral History Foundation 
(1998) 
 
Public Memory “The wound is healed, but the 
scars remain,” (Suara 
Pembaruan editorial, Oct. 
1991) 
Views of recognizing aggression 
and contribution to liberation, no 
need for apology to Holland 
Humiliation of losing colony and 
“camp sysndrome,” PM’s 
withdrawal of “We should 
apologize to Indonesia for the past” 
statement (Spring, 2000) 
“Memories never 
go outside of the 
borders of the 
country””  
Monuments Romusha figure in Museum 
of National History in Jakarta 
“Greater East Asia Holy War” 
monument in Gokoku Shrine, 
Kanazawa City (Summer 2000)
East Indies monument (1988, 
cabinet decree making Aug. 15, on a 
par with liberation from Nazis 
anniversary (1999) 
 
First visit by 
“head of state” 
1958 Pres. Sukarno’s Japan 
visit,  
1970 Pres. Suharto’s Holland 
visit 
1971 Emperor’s Holland visit 
1991 Emperor’s Indonesia visit 
1991 Queen Beatric’s Japan visit,  
1995 Queen Beatric’s Indonesia 
visit 
 
History- 
related 
movements 
Former Heiho members 
demand Japanese 
compensation for “comfort 
women” (NGO supported) 
Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reform (established 
1996) 
Regular SJE demonstrations in front 
of Japanese Embassy by  
Contrast of Japan 
and Indonesia/ 
Holland 
Remarks Research, public memory 
movement have the same 
basic direction 
Gap between research and public 
memory movement 
Growing gap in research between 
“revisionism” and public memory 
movement 
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Table 2 Comparison of Japan and Indonesia as Ruler 
 
 Japanese occupation of Indonesia Indonesian rule of East Timor 
Period WWII (Mar 1942-Aug 1945) Cold War & Post-Cold War (July 
1976-Oct. 1999) 
Former suzerain state and their 
reaction 
Netherlands: gov’t in exile in 
London, Melbourne 
Portugal: abandons sovereignty?
works for solution of “conflict” 
Ideology of rule Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere 
Uniting of brothers 
Objective of rule Acquisition of resources Security  
Justification of rule National liberation Request from the people 
Form of rule Direct rule by military authority Indonesianization under force of 
arms 
Form of resistance Passive resistance, sporadic uprising Guerrillas in mountain areas, urban 
resistance, international solidarity  
Social change Diffusion of Indonesian, growth of 
Indonesian nationalism 
Diffusion of Tetum and Catholicism, 
growth of East Timorese nationalism
Occasion of end of rule Japanese defeat in war Collapse of Suharto regime 
International environment at time of 
independence 
International support  International support 
National language at time of 
independence 
Indonesian Portuguese (Tetum) 
Relations after end of rule Jan. 1958 peace treaty July 2002 establishment of 
diplomatic relations 
Post-independence view of former 
ruler 
Wounds healed, scars remain Calls for cooperations and 
reconciliation 
Historical perception by former ruler Perception of aggression and 
contribution to liberation theory 
Seroja Monument in Jakarta 
   
 
 
 
